Dream-Saver? Olympic Boycotts and the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act’s Oppression Remedy

  • October 22, 2021

by Gregory Cherniak, winner of the 2021 Charities and Not-for-Profit Law Section's student essay contest.


In the spring of 1980, Diane Jones-Konihowski was as close to being a sure thing to win an Olympic gold medal for Canada as there has ever been. The twenty-nine-year-old pentathlete was at the top of her game, having competed in the 1972 and 1976 Olympics, but in her late twenties she had entered what is considered the peak age for multi-event track athletes.1 However, the rising star would never get her chance to win a prized Olympic gold, for there were events brewing on the world stage which sidelined Team Canada.

On April 26, 1980, under immense pressure from political and financial partners, the Canadian Olympic Association (“COA”) (now the Canadian Olympic Committee (“COC”)) voted overwhelmingly in favour of boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympic Games that were set to take place in Moscow, USSR.2 With this action, the COA ended the Olympic dreams of hundreds of Canadian athletes, like Jones-Konihowski, but affirmed the Canadian government’s Cold War stance against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. With the 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games set to take place in Beijing, China, there have been similar calls for Canada to boycott these games to protest the Chinese government’s human rights record.3

While there is some debate regarding the effectiveness of boycotts, it is beyond doubt that boycotts have a very real impact on athletes. Canadian athletes spend years training for the Olympic Games, and due to the cyclical nature of the event, losing out on one Olympics could be an athlete’s only opportunity to compete (and win).4 The loss of the 1980 Olympics has left a lasting negative impact on the careers of Canadian athletes and coaches, giving rise to an interesting legal question: what rights do Canadian athletes have if a boycott were to be ordered?5 This paper will examine the mechanism for how an Olympic boycott actually works in Canada, and what legal avenues Canadian athletes can most realistically explore to challenge a boycott. Ultimately, if the COC decides to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Canadian athletes are left with few realistic legal possibilities to successfully stop this action, and their likelihood of success is small. Given the quick turnaround required and the unique legal relationship between athletes and the COC, the most cogent path would be through a court-ordered injunction by way of an application of oppression through the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act.6


In order to analyze the legal rights of Canadian athletes if a boycott occurs, the authority and mechanism for how a boycott is ordered must be situated. The decision to boycott an Olympic Games ultimately rests in the hands of the COC, but this is not necessarily the entire story. There are a number of players in this situation, both internationally and within Canada. The COC, as a certified National Olympic Commission (“NOC”), has the “exclusive authority” regarding the representation of Canada at the Olympic Games, and selects the teams and athletes based on recommendations from national sport governing bodies (“NSO”).7 This power is derived from the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”), which has the “supreme authority” over the “Olympic Movement” – meaning, they have power over all matters regarding the operations and application of the Olympic Games.8 The IOC does not consider itself the top governing body of the Olympics, but rather sees itself as the custodian of the Olympic Charter, which is the governing constitution for the Games.

This system for international Olympic governance was designed to avoid political interference. For instance, legally the COC is not a member of the IOC, nor is the IOC a confederation of NOCs.9 In theory, this guarantees a level of autonomy for the COC as long as it respects the Olympic Charter, and there are few ways that the IOC can actually interfere with its operations. However, where this idealism of political non-interference meets reality is within national boundaries.

The COC is a private, not-for-profit organization registered federally under the CNCA.10 Both as a private corporation, and through the responsibilities and autonomy given to it by the IOC, the COC is supposed to be free from both international and domestic political interference. This political and institutional freedom is required by the Olympic Charter.11 In reality, this principle is more aspirational than a firm practice, for the COC frequently interacts with, and is largely dependent on, government and government-adjacent partners. For instance, Sport Canada – a wing of the federal Department of Canadian Heritage – directs $302.4 million dollars every year to Canada’s amateur sport system and the Olympic development process.12 Crucially, this includes initiatives ranging from the Athlete Assistance Program, which financially assists high-performance athletes; to the Sport Support Program, which strengthens NSOs; and Own The Podium, which finances the development of potential Olympic and Paralympic athletes. Though the COC is financially independent and relies on corporate sponsorships, its mission and the operation of sport in Canada is heavily reliant on the government.

Per the CNCA, the COC has a Board of Directors that manage its affairs, and ultimately votes on policy, budgeting, and direction.13 The Board is accountable to the Session, which includes representatives from all competing NSOs, and various Canadian stakeholders including athletes, coaches, resident Canadian members of the IOC and international sporting federations, as well as the CEO as a non-voting member.14 The Board of Directors numbers nineteen, while the Session comprises seventy-nine voting members. Both of these bodies are supported by the COC Membership, which number over 3,500, and is comprised of athletes, coaches, and further stakeholders who “act as a body of knowledge in the strategic consultation process of the COC.”15 This institutional governance is standard, though as has been noted, it is the financial and political influence placed on the COC that makes it unique.

There are no sections within the COC bylaws which specifically deal with the powers to boycott. To understand how the political actors in Canada and the COC interact to produce a boycott, one must look back to 1980. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, calls to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics grew louder, and United States President Jimmy Carter formally called for a boycott on January 20, 1980.16 The United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”), under legal threat from their federal government, later voted to comply with the boycott. As scholars like Crossman and Lappage note, the Canadian decision to boycott the Moscow Games was less a decision to boycott, and more of a decision to support their American allies in the Cold War.17 Initially, Prime Minister Joe Clark refused to condone the boycott, but after increasing political pressure from the United States, Clark relented and announced the Canadian government’s support on January 29, 1980. At this time, the head of the COA, Richard Pound, announced that the Canadian delegation would head to the Moscow Games regardless of what the federal government ordered.18

Things changed in March 1980. When the COA Board of Directors voted to support Pound’s stance on attending the games, the Olympic Trust of Canada – a private donor group and the precursor to Own the Podium – announced the following day that it would withdraw all funding if the COA did not comply with the boycott.19 What followed next was a series of meetings between Pound and the federal government, where funding cuts and both moral and financial support were threatened if the COA did not comply. This resulted in a new COA vote in April 1980, where the members voted 137-35 in favour of a boycott.20

As can be seen from the events of the spring of 1980, though the COC may be nominally independent, in reality it is far from that. The political and financial realities necessary to field a national Olympic team is heavily dependent on actors beyond the walls of the COC. Structurally, the COC is similar to its precursor the COA, and if the federal government and public opinion were to support a boycott of the 2022 Olympic Games, the COC will have little choice but to comply. However, there have been advances in Canadian law over the past forty years which would aid Canadian athletes to have their rights in this process seen and heard.


At the time of this paper’s writing in March 2021, there are now less than eleven months until the 2022 Winter Olympic Games. If the COC were to formally boycott the Games within that time, swift legal action would be required by athletes. A court-ordered interlocutory injunction provides the most immediate legal action that could order the COC to halt the boycott and allow Team Canada to compete. However, in order to motion for an interlocutory injunction, a complainant must first disclose a cause of action.21 In this case, the most prudent cause of action that would realistically allow athletes to obtain such an interim order, would be an application for oppression under the CNCA. As the COC is a federally incorporated not-for-profit headquartered in Ontario, any potential lawsuit would be brought in that province.22

An application for oppression by stakeholders is a relatively new development in Canadian law. Oppression is an equitable remedy personally available to shareholders and other parties where the actions of the corporation may impact their legitimate interests.23 This is included under s. 253(1) of the CNCA, which sets out that a complainant may make an order that a corporation acted oppressively or unfairly prejudicial to their interests through (a) any act or omission; (b) any conduct; or (c) the exercise of the powers of directors or officers.24 In the 2008 Supreme Court of Canada decision, BCE Inc, the Court set out a two-step inquiry for oppression, which determines (1) if the evidence supports the reasonable expectation asserted by the claimant, and (2) if the evidence establishes that the reasonable expectation was violated by conduct that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.25 If this test is met, the court can make an interim or final order on a number of activities, ranging from restraining the conduct complained of all the way to dissolving the corporation.26

Claiming oppression arguably provides the best opportunity to bring a successful motion for an injunction. Other potential causes of action, such as breach of contract, tort, or a Charter of Rights and Freedoms violation, are less likely to succeed.27 For instance, there is no formal contract between athletes and the COC, who are defined as “participants” in the Olympic process.28 Outside of challenging governance through the CNCA, the only contractual duties that could be argued against the COC regard athlete selections to Olympic teams, which would fall into the jurisdiction of the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada.29 A negligence suit would be equally dubious, as it would require a court to determine that exercising the right to boycott is below the standard of care for an NOC – which is highly unlikely.

Charter claims regarding the decisions of sport bodies are an interesting, but also uncertain, cause of action. For instance, in the 2009 British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, Sagen v VANOC, a group of female ski jumpers brought a claim of gender discrimination under the Charter s. 15(1) against the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games (“VANOC”),30 over the decision to exclude women’s ski jumping. Though both the trial judge and Court of Appeal agreed that VANOC was not liable for the decision, as it came from the IOC, the controversial question was whether the Charter applied to VANOC as a private body. Nominally, the Charter only applies to government action, but if there is enough “control” of a private body by the government, a court may determine that the Charter applies to its action.31 The two levels of court disagreed on this point, and the BCCA ruled narrowly, holding that in the specific decision to exclude ski jumping there was not enough government control, but they reserved judgment on the control of VANOC and other Olympic bodies as a whole.32 However, regardless of whether the Charter would apply to actions of the COC, there are no specific Charter protections which would conceivably cover participation in international sporting events. However, Canadian corporate and not-for-profit law provides one possible solution.

Unlike in the United States, where corporations only need to act in the best interest of their shareholders, with the decision in BCE Inc,the common law in Canada moved towards recognizing the legitimate interests of stakeholders.33 In BCE Inc, the Court per curiam held that directors of corporations may, but are not required to, consider the interests of stakeholders to inform their decisions.34 The Court also provided guidance in this case on how stakeholders fit into a claim for oppression – noting that the reasonable expectations of stakeholders are the “cornerstone of the oppression remedy.”35 A corporation’s considerations towards stakeholder expectations was later codified in s. 122(1.1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, which now sets out a list of who and what can be considered in determining the “best interests” of the corporation. This includes a definition of stakeholders (shareholders, employees, pensioners, creditors, etc.), the environment, as well as the “long-term interests” of the corporation.36 Because of this ruling and its codification, courts may now consider the interests of stakeholders with regards to corporate activity, and certain stakeholders have a better chance to bring a claim for oppression.

Although the CNCA does not presently include the post-BCE Inc codification changes, and currently limits the duty of directors and officers to the “best interests” of the corporation, this is not an insurmountable issue.37 With BCE Inc, there is now an argument to be made that the common law generally recognizes the interests of stakeholders in a corporate setting, which conceivably extends to not-for-profit corporations. This extension of the common law, as well as the similar features and role the CBCA and CNCA fulfill, may also provide grounds for establishing that CBCA s. 122(1.1) should be read into the CNCA. Another potential hurdle is the scope of the duty owed by a not-for-profit board. It is currently unsettled law in Canada whether a not-for-profit’s board of directors owe a fiduciary duty to members of the corporation.38 This is because the board’s responsibility is to ensure the membership’s own priorities do not override the corporation’s stated purpose. However, there is an argument in this case that the Olympic athletes who form the COC’s membership are a unique class of stakeholders with respect to the corporation’s stated purpose of fielding a successful national team at Olympic Games.

In order to be considered a stakeholder, an athlete who wishes to bring this application must first qualify as a “complainant” under CNCA s. 250.39 That section recognizes complainants as any former or present members, shareholders, president or director(s), as well as “any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application.”40 Under this criterion then, an athlete who is either a member or a former member of the COC Session would have standing to bring an oppression claim under CNCA s. 250(a). There is a further argument that non-member athletes could qualify under the “proper person” test, where the court will consider whether a non-listed complainant had a “reasonable expectation” that was frustrated by the conduct of the corporation.41 For this potential litigation, it is more likely that a former or current athlete member of the Session would be willing to bring forward this action. The other elements for an application are established under CNCA s. 251(2), which requires that the suit is brought in good faith, and that it appears to be in the “interest of the corporation” that the action be brought and defended.42 Given the public interest and political ramifications of such a decision, a court would be unlikely to strike out the application at this stage.

There are a number of important legal questions surrounding this hypothetical oppression suit, which would undoubtedly require prolonged litigation. Such a decision would likely be appealed, as lasting precedent would be sought regarding the future of COC and Canadian not-for-profit conduct. However, the ultimate and final success of this litigation is not crucial to determining the outcome of a Beijing Games boycott. Due to the immediacy (in judicial terms) of a decision required for February 2022, the most effective way to achieve a result that overcomes a COC boycott is through a court-ordered interlocutory injunction. An injunction is a judicial remedy awarded for the purpose of requiring a party to refrain from a certain act.43 For the purposes of the oppression remedy, Canadian courts have determined that an interim order is akin to an interlocutory injunction, and the same legal test is used.44 Both an interim oppression order as well as an injunction are unique when compared to other court-ordered remedies, such as damages, which are backward-looking and compensatory in nature. An interlocutory injunction maintains the status quo during litigation and is differentiated from a mandatory injunction, requiring positive action, or a permanent injunction, established at the end of a trial.

The legal test for an interlocutory injunction was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1994 decision, RJR MacDonald v Canada (Attorney General).45 The three-part test first determines whether there is a serious question to be tried; second, if the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were not granted; and third, if the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction.46

Regarding the oppression remedy, there is some disagreement amongst courts over the first stage of the RJR test. In the 2009 Ontario Superior Court of Justice case, JLL Pantheon Holdings v Patheon Inc, Justice Wilton-Siegel held that in the context of an oppression action, the first inquiry is not whether there is a “a serious question to be tried”, but rather whether there is a “strong prima facie case” of oppression.47 This is because Justice Wilton-Siegel determined that the court was “effectively being asked for a final determination on the basis of a relatively complete record.”48 This ruling was distinguished more recently by Justice Doi, who in Macreanu v Godino, held that the “strong prima facie” standard is a rare exception to the RJR test, even in the oppression context, and arises only when “the right to be protected may only be exercised immediately or not at all.”49

Because determining the standard used in the first part of the RJR test is based on an analysis made by the motion judge on the facts at hand, it is outside the scope of this hypothetical analysis. However, it is clear that for any athletes bringing suit, the original RJR “serious issue” standard is preferrable. Litigating the “strong prima facie” standard question would require an in-depth analysis of the oppression remedy as it applies to the case at hand. This includes the disputed questions of law noted earlier, including the application of the two-step BCE Inc test for oppression to the CNCA. This is in contrast to the “serious question” standard, which Justices Sopinka and Cory in RJR determined is examined “on the basis of common sense and an extremely limited review of the case on the merits.”50 This standard is a relatively low bar, which would only be denied if the court considered the application vexatious or frivolous. It is likely that the standard chosen may rest on the how the legal question is framed, and if the court views the outcome of the lawsuit as only influencing the Beijing Games, or the COC’s power to boycott more generally.

The second question in the RJR analysis is whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were not granted. “Irreparable” considers the nature of the harm rather than its magnitude, and it must be harm that cannot be quantified in a monetary value through damages.51 This standard would likely be satisfied by the athletes. Though a court may be able to place a monetary value on the financial impact the loss of an Olympics would have on an athlete’s career, there is an argument that the experience and impact of competing at an Olympic Games provides benefits that cannot be quantified in any meaningful way. The precedent of the 1980 boycott and its impact would be an important consideration at this stage, for the court would be able to examine scholarship on a boycott’s impact in Canadian sport.52

The third stage of the RJR test is likely where this case would be decided. At this point the court weighs the balance of convenience in awarding the injunction, and also considers the public interest.53 This analysis relies on the court’s determination of irreparable harm at stage two and determines which party would suffer the greatest harm. The athletes in this case would argue that their interests would undoubtedly suffer greater harm, for some may lose out on their only opportunity to compete in an Olympic event. Conversely, the COC would argue that losing their power to decide Canada’s participation and representation at the Olympic Games through this injunction would permanently damage their institutional autonomy. Regarding the public interest, RJR considered an injunction in the context of a Charter remedy, and therefore determined that public policy considerations were required at this stage.54 As has been demonstrated with the political and social ramifications which would lead to a boycott, it is plausible the court would consider public policy here as well. The participation of Team Canada at the Olympics has important social and political consequences. It is likely that the COC would only vote to boycott after immense political pressure, and it is equally likely that this level of political pressure would only be present if the Canadian generally public supported such a boycott. Therefore, both the balance of convenience and the consideration of the public interest would be crucial to the court’s determination of whether to grant injunctive relief or not. How a court may rule on this question is difficult to predict.


Two weeks after the boycotted 1980 Summer Olympics, Diane Jones-Konihowski competed at a pentathlon in West Germany and came first, beating every pentathlete in the field who had medalled in Moscow.55 Jones-Konihowski retired before the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, so the “what-ifs” of her and arguably an entire generation of Canadian Olympians were left unsatisfied by the 1980 boycott. Regarding any potential boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, this paper has argued that the most viable path to blocking that action would be through an interlocutory injunction by way of the CNCA’s oppression remedy. Ultimately however, it is uncertain whether Canadian Olympians would succeed through such an action. There are far too many legal ambiguities surrounding the application of the oppression remedy, and at such a stage, it is likely that a court would be ruling against popular public opinion in overturning a boycott.

In this case, a legal solution to the issue does not appear realistic, and even a successful action by the athletes has ethical consequences. There is a far greater and more equitable solution to this potential dilemma faced by Canadian Olympians over the next year: move the Games elsewhere. Instead of forcing Canadian athletes to wade into the political and legal landscape, the COC and the IOC can simply select another site. There are numerous ready built winter Olympic facilities in countries across the globe, in far less controversial home venues. A decision such as this would remove any need for a boycott and corresponding legal actions, returning the discussions and celebrations of the Olympics to what they should be about – the Games, and the athletes.


Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44.

Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, SC 2009, c 23.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194.


BCE Inc v 1976 Debenture Holders, 2008 SCC 569.

Campaign for the Inclusion of People who are Deaf and Hard of Hearing v Canadian Hearing Society, 2018 ONSC 5445.

De Frantz v United States Olympic Committee, 492 F Supp 1181 (DC Cir 1980).

Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Limited, 2017 ONCA 1014.

Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation of Students, 2009 SCC 31.

JLL Pantheon Holdings v Patheon Inc (2009), 178 ACWS (3d) 218.

London Humane Society (Re), 2010 ONSC 5775.

MacIsaac v David, 2019 BCSC 931.

Macreanu v Godino, 2020 ONSC 535.

RJR MacDonald v Canada (Attorney General) (1994), 1 SCR 311.

Sagen v Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2009 BCCA 522.


Canadian Olympic Committee, “Policy Statement on Conduct” (14 October 2017), online (pdf); “Governance” (2020), online.

Corporations Canada, Corporate Profile: CANADIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE COMITÉ OLYMPIQUE CANADIEN (Federal Corporation Information, 034891-1), online.

Crossman, Jane and Ron Lappage, “Canadian Coaches’ Perceptions of the 1980 Olympic Boycott,” (1980) 95 Perceptual Motor Skills 68; “Canadian Athletes’ Perceptions of the 1980 Olympic Boycott” (1992), 9 Soc Sport J 354.

Government of Canada, “Role of Sport Canada” (3 April 2020), online.

Gillespie, Kerry. “Canadian athletes remember, sadly, 1980 Olympic boycott,” (16 August 2013), online: Toronto Star.

International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Charter” (Lausanne: Comité International Olympique, 2020) at 31, online.

Mestre, Alexandre Miguel, “The legal and institutional framework of Olympic Games: an introductory analysis on the Olympic Charter and on the International Olympic Committee” (Barcelona: Centre d’Estudis Olímpics, 2013).

Mitten, Matthew J et al, “Sports Law: Governance and Regulation”, 2nd ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016).

Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada, “Canadian Sport Dispute Resolution Code” (2021), online.

Urback, Robyn, “If genocide isn’t a good enough reason to boycott the Beijing Olympics, what is?” (5 February 2021), online: The Globe and Mail.


1 Kerry Gillespie, “Canadian athletes remember, sadly, 1980 Olympic boycott,” (16 August 2013), online: Toronto Star.
2 The 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics did not include the 1980 Summer Paralympics, which went on without boycott in Arnhem, Netherlands. The Soviets had refused to host the Paralympics.
3 See e.g. Robyn Urback, “If genocide isn’t a good enough reason to boycott the Beijing Olympics, what is?” (5 February 2021), online: The Globe and Mail.
4 This paper refers to rights of Canadian Olympic and Paralympic athletes referring to both as “athletes.” All noting of the 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Games as the “Olympics” inherently refers to both games. The Canadian Paralympic Committee is a separate body from the COC, but the legal analysis for a similar action would be the same.
5 See Jane Crossman and Ron Lappage, “Canadian Athletes’ Perceptions of the 1980 Olympic Boycott” (1992), 9 Soc Sport J 354 (“Crossman & Lappage”). See also Jane Crossman and Ron Lappage, “Canadian Coaches’ Perceptions of the 1980 Olympic Boycott,” (1980) 95 Perceptual Motor Skills 68.
6 SC 2009, c 23 (“CNCA”).
7 Matthew J Mitten et al, “Sports Law: Governance and Regulation”, 2nd ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2016) at 463.
8 Ibid at 463; International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Charter” (Lausanne: Comité International Olympique, 2020) at 31, online: (The IOC is an international, non-governmental, not-for-profit organization of unlimited duration, governed by Swiss law).
9 Alexandre Miguel Mestre, “The legal and institutional framework of Olympic Games: an introductory analysis on the Olympic Charter and on the International Olympic Committee” (Barcelona: Centre d’Estudis Olímpics, 2013) at 14.
10 Corporations Canada, “Corporate Profile: CANADIAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE COMITÉ OLYMPIQUE CANADIEN” (Federal Corporation Information, 034891-1), online.
11 Olympic Charter, supra note 8 at 16.
12 Government of Canada, “Role of Sport Canada” (3 April 2020), online.
13 Canadian Olympic Committee, “Governance” (2020), online; CNCA, supra note 6, s 3.
14 Canadian Olympic Committee, supra note 13.
15 Ibid.
16 Crossman & Lappage, supra note 5 at 356.
17 Ibid at 358.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid at 359.
21 “Rules of Civil Procedure”, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 40.01; In the context of Olympic boycotts, an injunction was applied for by American Olympians to overcome the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (De Frantz v United States Olympic Committee, 492F Supp 1181 (DC Cir 1980)). This application was rejected by the District Court for failing to disclose a viable action, and specifically because the right to compete in the Olympics was not guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
22 CNCA, supra note 6, s 261.
23 BCE Inc v 1976 Debenture Holders, 2008 SCC 569 at paras 50–54 (BCE Inc).
24 Supra note 6, s 251(1)(a)–(c).
25 Supra note 23 at para 68.
26 CNCA, supra note 6, s 251(3).
27 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (Charter).
28 Canadian Olympic Committee, “Policy Statement on Conduct” (14 October 2017), s 2, online (pdf).
29 Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada, “Canadian Sport Dispute Resolution Code” (2021), s 2.2, online.
30 Sagen v Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2009 BCCA 522 (Sagen v VANOC).
31 Supra note 27, s 32; Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation of Students, 2009 SCC 31 at para 16.
32 Sagen v VANOC, supra note 30 at para 49.
33 See eg, Harris v Carter (1990), 582 A2d 222 (Del Ch); BCE Inc, supra note 23.
34 Supra note 23 at para 40.
35 Ibid at para 61.
36 RSC 1985, c C-44 (CBCA).
37 Supra note 6,s 148(1).
38 London Humane Society (Re), 2010 ONSC 5775 at para 19.
39 Supra note 6.
40 Ibid,s 250(a)–(e).
41 “Campaign for the Inclusion of People who are Deaf and Hard of Hearing v Canadian Hearing Society”, 2018 ONSC 5445 at para 27; The factors for determining a “proper person” are set out in Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Limited, 2017 ONCA 1014 at para 123: (1) a prima facie case that merits an oppression action; (2) the proposed action has a restructuring purpose; (3) other stakeholders are not better placed to be a complainant.
42 Supra note 6.
43 “Canadian Law Dictionary”, 7th ed, sub verbo “injunction.”
44 MacIsaac v David, 2019 BCSC 931 at para 44; Macreanu v Godino, 2020 ONSC 535 at para 68 (Godino).
45 1 SCR 311 (RJR).
46 Ibid at para 48.
47 178 ACWS (3d) 218 at para 42.
48 Ibid.
49 Godino, supra note 44 at para 69.
50 Supra note 45 at para 83.
51 Ibid at para 64
52 Crossman & Lappage, supra note 5.
53 RJR, supra note 45 at para 67.
54 Ibid at para 70.
55 Gillespie, supra note 1.