by Riley Parker
I. Introduction
What does it mean to be truly charitable? While there appears to be a relatively universal definition in the common parlance of English speakers, we find a greater variety of opinion when it comes to analyzing the motivations and behaviours of modern governments. In the Anglosphere, charity finds its legal roots in the Protestant Reformation, where an epidemic of poverty prompted the state to incentivize the philanthropy of wealthy private donors. In contrast, Nordic countries have, in the last century, developed a unique style of social democratic welfare that treats poor relief as a state responsibility rather than a private enterprise. Accordingly, while Anglo countries rank particularly high in metrics of charitability, Nordic countries overwhelmingly come out on top in international comparisons of human wellbeing.
To follow is a history of the charitable ethos, tracing its philosophical roots from the ancient cultures of the Levant down through to the Catholic tradition of Medieval Europe. From there, a comparative analysis of charitability as manifest in early modern England and Scandinavia serves to identify the roots of modern differences between policy attitudes towards social welfare in Anglo and Nordic states today. While there were a variety of factors that contributed to the distinct development of charitability in these two regions, religious orientation seems to be of considerable distinction. While Calvinism had a significant influence on the development of the English church, Lutheranism played a much larger role in Scandinavia. Soteriological differences between Calvinism and Lutheranism seem to correlate with the differences between modern policy rationale in Anglo and Nordic states respectively, and accordingly with the different metrics of individual wellbeing we see in these two regions. While there is debate regarding the ultimate definition or goal of charity, if the goal is to help the poor and promote greater social equality, then the Nordic model of state-based social democratic welfare is more effective at achieving this goal than the Anglo model of charities law rooted in private philanthropy.
II. History of Charity from the Greeks to the Reformation
Charity in the Western tradition is inextricably linked to the history of the Christian Church. The cardinal virtue, charity was arguably the principle upon which the entire Christian religion was built. Its conceptual roots predate the life of Christ though, harking back to the earlier Greek thought that would be so influential on early Church thought.
Platonic Developments: Charity as Love
In the Symposium, Plato explores the definition of love, telling the story of a dinner party where guests are asked to make speeches in praise of Eros, god of love and desire.1 Agathon proposes that Love is the youngest of all gods, that Eros is an enemy of old age and shuns senility, and that Love is the source of all human virtues: wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. The object of love is ultimately beauty, in his view.2
Socrates, in response to Agathon, recalls a story told to him by Diotima. She claimed that Eros is not a god but a spirit that mediates human desire, and love is merely that desire. Interchange, either physical or intellectual, between entities is love manifest. Coming to know the form of beauty through this interchange is the greatest knowledge that humans must try to achieve. Diotima explains that Love is a demon rather than a human or god, born during a banquet to celebrate the birth of Aphrodite, god of beauty, love, and passion. Porus, god of wealth, was passed out drunk, when Poverty, coming to beg, slept with the unconscious Porus, conceiving the child Love. Love inherited ugliness and homelessness from his mother, but cunning and knowledge of beauty from his father. Beauty, says Diotima, is not the end but the means to something greater, the achievement of reproduction and birth, a mortal’s only claim to immortality. Some are pregnant in body alone, hoping to birth children, but others are pregnant in body and mind, carrying wisdom, virtue, and the art of civic order.3
Ultimate love, as per Diotima, is Platonic love as we know it in the modern age: love of the form of love, love for its own sake, rather than love of fleeting beauty or sexual pleasure. Socrates, embodying this type of love, is contrasted with the brazen and inebriated Alcibiades who laments his unrequited sexual advances towards the former.4 Alcibiades’ beauty corrupts him, leading to debauchery and disaster in political and military endeavours, contrasted with Socrates’ notorious ugliness and unwavering moral virtue. This notion of love ascending from base material appreciation to an affection directed at something transcendent lays the foundation for the philosophical origins of love in the early Christian Church. The former, baser version of love is one of self-interest and gratification through physical or material means, while the latter, higher version of love is selfless and embodies an appreciation towards all bodies and peoples.
The various Greek interpretations of love are important when considering the subsequent development of early Christian thought on charity. While eros has come to be defined as erotic or passionate love, and philia a more generic or friendly affection, agape became the predominant term for selfless love of God and one’s community. It is an acknowledgment of someone else’s need, without the desire to fulfil our own and without expectation of reciprocity. This higher stratum of love became the foundation for medieval Christian definitions of charity.
Medieval Charity: Augustine and Aquinas
Prior to the Protestant Reformation in Europe, the Catholic Church had an epistemic and moral monopoly. European philosophy in this era was synonymous with theology, and philosophical concepts were exclusively described through a distinctly Christian lens. Charity is no different; indeed, the English word charity comes from the Latin caritas. Two influential Church fathers, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, were fundamental to the doctrinal development of charitability within the Christian religion and accordingly laid the foundation for the conceptualization of charity today, building upon ancient Greek origins and adapting them for Western predilections.
Saint Augustine of Hippo grew up in North Africa, following three distinct Hellenistic belief systems prior to his Christian conversion: Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism, particularly the latter.5 While the former two find their roots in the Greek philosophy of Zeno and Plato, Manichaeism was a Persian religion incorporating a dualist worldview in the vein of the earlier Zoroastrianism; good and evil both exist, and God unilaterally selects both the elect and the damned.6 While earlier Christian Church fathers rejected deistic predestination as a pagan belief, Augustine incorporated these Manichean principles into his Christian writings following his conversion. In an attempt to convert the Pelagians, proto-anabaptists, Augustine contended that baptism removes original guilt, and that predestination is what led certain parents to baptize their children and certain parents to avoid the same.7 Since God gets everything that He wants, He does not desire salvation for all, otherwise all people would be saved. These views on salvation are fundamental to understanding subsequent English theological developments. On charity specifically, Augustine defined it as being both the love of God, God’s love for humanity, and humanity’s love for one another. It was charity that enabled Christians to live in harmony with each other and seek salvations, a la the commandment to love thy neighbor. Indeed, in 1 Thessalonians 1:3, Saint Paul writes that of the three theological virtues – faith, hope, and agape – the latter is the greatest. In 1 Corinthians 13 we read that agape is first among these because it informs the others, bearing all things, believing all things, hoping all things, and enduring all things.
Thomas Aquinas built on Augustinian writings in his Summa Theologica, echoing his predecessor in the notion that charity was the perfect virtue in that it perfects and underlies all others. He contended that rather than being a passive or emotional love, it was instead a deliberate rational act of one’s will.8 Notably, Aquinas believed that while the four cardinal virtues – prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, the same as espoused by Agathon – were attainable by all humans, the three cardinal virtues – faith, hope, and charity – were only available to those who had received divine grace, a notion that we will see again in our analysis of Calvinism below.
Medieval charity was primarily a way to elevate one’s social standing and reaffirm existing power hierarchies.9 The course of Biblical hermeneutics highlights this succinctly. Saint Thomas More was critical of his predecessor Tyndale’s translation of agape in the New Testament as love rather than charity. The King James Version translates agape inconsistently as one or the other depending on context, but modern translations tend to use the word love exclusively in all instances, despite the New Testament context almost always referring to the broader virtue of caritas rather than a lesser stratum of ordinary love. The translation of agape as love is inadequate. While love is simply a feeling, charity is a broader desire for a better world, it is a more inclusive and accurate encapsulation of the word agape’s intent. Indeed, in 1 Corinthians 13 Saint Paul describes how agape behaves rather than how it feels subjectively, and Aquinas used caritas rather than amor in his writings.10 Therefore, it seems that in the Christian context, love is more accurately described as charity.
III. Charitable History in the Anglosphere
At common law, charity formally entered our lexicon in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. Religious reform in England led to the effective demise of the Catholic Church and a general trend towards greater religious diversity and secularization. Calvinism came to play an important role in religious understanding, and its influence further shaped (and was shaped by) the social landscape in England. Policy decisions in England and her later colonies have largely followed the legal framework established during this era, creating a system that expects and tolerates inequality, where charity is a palliative measure rather than a long-term solution to poverty.
Roots of Reformation
When King Henry VIII broke with Rome, he became Supreme Head of the Church of England. While theological changes during his reign were minor when compared with his heirs, the fabric of the English social structure nevertheless became irreparably torn. The Church was a significant political entity in the medieval era, functioning as the quasi-governmental head of Christendom in Western Europe. Polities in this era are more accurately thought of us federal states within the realm of Christendom, rather than truly sovereign nations.11 As such, the English Reformation was effectively a succession from papist rule and all the aspects of Roman interference that came with it. Roughly one in fifty Englishmen were members of a religious order at the time, and the Church held incomprehensible power over land, politics, and the thoughts of believers.12 When Henry broke with Rome, he dissolved the monasteries and expropriated Church land, later selling it to fund war with France.13 Monastic institutions and other religious orders had, up to that point, performed a significant amount of poor relief in England, such as giving alms and food to the poor and destitute. The closure of the monasteries brought these processes to an abrupt end, and poverty soon became an epidemic.
Under Henry’s heirs, religious doctrine within the Church of England became decidedly Calvinistic. Though Queen Mary, a Catholic, reversed the Reformation and reunited with Rome, her successor Elizabeth brought about a religious settlement that attempted to quell the competing Catholic and Protestant factions in her kingdom, ultimately adopting Protestantism but granting considerable leeway of belief, opening the door to significant religious plurality in England.14 That said, English religion became intimately influenced by Calvinist theology at all levels. Regnans in Excelsis, a papal bull excommunicating Elizabeth, specifically condemned her for following the rule of Calvin.15 While certain factions of the Church maintained a more elaborate Catholic tradition, the bulk of English believers were profoundly influenced by Calvinism in one way or another, and this influence accordingly shaped the institutions of which they were a part.
Development of English Charity Law
The charitable vacuum created by the dissolution of the monasteries led to widespread poverty and the need for a response from the Crown. The Elizabethan Poor Laws were enacted to address the needy who had been neglected since the cessation of alms. While England had expropriated Church land following the break with Rome, the sale of that land to fund war with France had depleted the treasury, and by the time of Elizabeth’s reign the Exchequer was in dire straits. Accordingly, the ensuing charitable legislation was less so a Crown response to poverty and more so an incentivization for non-state actors to perform charitable tasks. The Poor Law Act 1601 states that a certain non-exhaustive list of activities would be considered charitable, and that individuals performing these activities would be granted favourable tax benefits.16 It distinguished between the unemployed and the unemployable, the former being capable of work while the later generally suffered from some disability that would have prevented reasonable employment; the former were punished while the later were entitled to charitable benefit. The Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 encouraged the privatization of philanthropy rather than instituting a state-based initiative to address it, setting the stage for all subsequent interpretations of charity at common law.17
Charity in Anglo states is notoriously difficult to define. In 1997, Hammond J. wrote in D V Bryant Trust Board v Hamilton City Council that “there is no intrinsic legal definition of charity. As a matter of technique, Courts can only describe the attributes of charities.”18 While jurisdictions like Australia and the United Kingdom have since created statutory definitions of charity, they leave much to be desired. The law of England and Wales defines a charity as “an institution which is established for charitable purposes only.”19 This circular definition is unhelpful, as pointed out in Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd, where it is said that “no one who has been versed for many years in this difficult and very artificial branch of the law can be unaware of its illogicalities.”20 The closest we get to a good definition at common law comes from Lord Macnaghten in the landmark case of Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel, where he outlined the four heads of charity: poor relief, advancement of education, advancement of religion, and other, other being a non-exhaustive list of entities approved as charitable at common law, often tracing their origin to the preamble of the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601.21
Juliet Chevalier-Watts, a scholar from New Zealand, contends that there is a thread running through all four of these heads from Pemsel: alleviating poverty and the suffering of others. Indeed, a review of case law under the religious head of charity highlights that eligibility for charitable status is fundamentally a matter of whether an organization provides some public benefit. A cloister of nuns praying to relieve the sins of the world cannot, in the eyes of the Court, prove to be of public benefit, and ergo is not worthy of charitable status.22 Alternatively, a mortgage lending scheme motivated by New Testament language that aides Christians so they may more easily evangelize was ultimately deemed charitable, as religion was at the core of the institution’s mandate and promoting religious doctrine, even if one doesn’t agree with it, is presumptively for public benefit.23 In Morice v Bishop of Durham, the Court asks “do purposes of liberality and benevolence mean the same as objects of charity? That word in its widest sense denotes all the good affections, men ought to bear towards each other; in its most restricted and common sense, relief of the poor.”24 Despite these attempted definitions, charities law has largely developed in an ad hoc fashion, where Courts retrospectively determine whether a pre-existing private institution ought to be considered charitable, rather than being a proactive approach whereby some state actor identifies the necessity of poor relief in society and responds to it accordingly. This incidental attitude towards charity is the essence of Anglo charities law.
The Calvinist Ethos
While it is fruitful to identify the legal history of English charity law, a broader understanding calls for an analysis of the philosophical justifications underlying and reinforcing this centuries old attitude towards poor relief within Anglo societies. While it is by no means the only explanation or justification for this state of affairs, the influence of Calvinism in England has undoubtedly had an impact on the cultural landscapes that have shaped the development of the local charitable ethos.
John Calvin was a Genevan theologian during the Reformation era, second only to Martin Luther in terms of notoriety. Calvinism, or Reformed theology, is one of the two main branches of Protestantism; while Lutheranism was more popular in the Holy Roman Empire, Scandinavia, and parts of Eastern Europe, Calvinism had greater influence in Western Europe, particularly Switzerland, the Netherlands, Britain, and France.25 While Huguenot persecution in France led to the definite consolidation of Catholicism there, Calvinist theology largely persisted in the Low Countries and Britain for some time.
There is a plethora of pedantic distinctions which may be drawn when comparing Calvinism with Lutheranism or Catholicism. Herein, soteriology, the study of salvation, will be the main focus. While a deeper comparative analysis of doctrinal differences could serve to highlight trends of divergence between England and Scandinavia, the essence of this section is merely to highlight that two distinct prevailing religious worldviews emerged in Northern Europe during the Reformation and they can largely be differentiated on the basis of attitudes towards one’s self, God, and one’s society. Highlighting these soteriological distinctions is all that need be done in order to expound upon subsequent public policy perspectives in modern times.
As noted above, Catholic thought held an iron grip on all aspects of medieval life, both temporal and spiritual. One’s salvation, and indeed one’s quality of life on Earth, was intimately linked to one’s relationship with the Church. Notoriously, it was the Church sale of indulgences that prompted Luther to protest in the first place; it was the Church that held the keys to salvation, and salvation was contingent upon being a good-standing member of the Church, rather than a good Christian in Luther’s view. Calvinism diverged from this perspective significantly. The Reformation, and indeed the contemporaneous Age of Discovery, brought about a secularization of epistemology in Europe; people began to think of things from beyond the framework of a solely Christian perspective. The dismantling of religious monopoly on thought cannot be overstated: the Reformation opened the door to novel conceptualizations of meaning and purpose within European societies, and the justifications of Reformation theologians and later enlightenment philosophers filled this now vacant epistemic niche.
Predestination was central to Calvinist soteriology. Consider the following: everything that happens is God’s will, and therefore God knows everything that will happen, and has always known everything that will happen. Since some will be saved and others will be damned, God must know who the saved, or the elect, are, and the status of whether someone is elect must be known to God at the time of that person’s birth (and indeed well before their birth too). While subjectively we may feel we have choice over whether we join the Church and have our children baptized, and they may have choice over whether they should act like a good Christian, Calvin believes that people who are drawn to this path are merely those who have been touched by divine grace already; they join the Church because they’re already going to be saved, not the other way around.26 Note the inherent inequality present here: some people will be saved no matter what, but others are damned no matter what. Calvin was adamant that the elect know that they are elect as a result of their actions. While Catholicism taught that faith and good works were the keys to salvation, Calvinism taught that faith in Christ alone was necessary, as good works would naturally follow if someone had true faith. Therefore, it is easy to imagine an English peasant, enduring a significant period of religious upheaval, learning that there’s a chance they may not be saved unless they truly believe that they are one of God’s chosen people, and work is the only way to prove to themselves and others that they are the elect.
Modern Ramifications
Prussian sociologist Max Weber famously described this concept as the Protestant Work Ethic, where he identified that Protestantism, specifically Calvinism, revolutionized epistemologies of labour.27 While labour had been merely a chore under Catholicism, something to sustain oneself and one’s community, something that we are condemned to due to Edenic transgressions, work under Calvinism became proof of one’s salvation. It is no surprise then that the Dutch Republic, a Calvinist state, laid the foundation for modern capitalism, a torch thereafter inherited by none other than England herself, thereafter the British Empire, and later the United States. Capitalism, private ownership of the means of production, and the notion that hard work is the key to salvation, are all consequences of the Calvinist charitable ethos. It birthed a harshly individualistic attitude towards attaining salvation and deeply imbedded within the Anglo psyche that some people will be poor no matter how hard they try. It is, in my view, decidedly unchristian that someone should tolerate the suffering of another when they themselves are working not for the benefit of their community or for charitable purposes, but to prove their own self-worth. Imperial, conservative, and later neoliberal policy making have been centred on promoting ‘individual liberality,’ that being the freedom of one with money to do what they please with that money. While a freedom, this is only a freedom for those who already have money; those without do not attain any benefit from this supposed freedom. In effect, a lack of agape and a solipsistic soteriology create an antithetical worldview from that advocated for by Christ. The charitable ethos in the English tradition became little more than a signal of one’s own divine grace rather than a social obligation, rather than the central tenet of Christianity.
In modern Anglo states, the legal framework for charity functions more as a palliative measure than a long-term solution to relieving poverty. There is an institutional expectation that inequality will continue to exist, and charities law is built on and profits from this presupposition. Anglo charitable policymaking does not attempt to put an end to poverty or widespread social inequality. Rather, it responds to the issue without attempting to combat it, conveniently functioning as a vehicle for tax aversion and a source of social capital for philanthropists along the way. While putting a band aid on a bullet wound may soak up some blood, it will never remove the bullet. Modern Anglo charities law engages with poverty but does not attempt to eliminate it. Arguably, it is beyond the capacity of private charitable organizations to tackle something so broad; the only institution with such a capacity is the state.
IV. History of the Nordic Charitable Ethos
The charitable ethos evolved differently in the Scandinavian states than in England. While charities exist in Nordic countries today, poverty is more substantively addressed by government initiative rather than private organizations.28 Instead of incentivizing private philanthropy, thereby exacerbating inequality, the Nordic countries developed a unique system of social democracy that has created a robust welfare state which provides for its citizens and ensures their collective wellbeing. This centralized perspective on addressing poverty has been revolutionary, and the Nordic countries perform extraordinarily well on metrics of human wellbeing. To follow is a history of the Reformation in Scandinavia, analyzing how Lutheran thought influenced Scandinavian and later Nordic culture, setting the stage for the social democratic policy reforms of the early twentieth century.
Political Context: Nationalism
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had been in personal union for over a century. The Kalmar Union, ruled largely from Denmark, drew the ire of the Swedish nobility, and they successfully fought for independence in 1523, taking their long-held territory in Finland with them. In the wake of revolt, Denmark quickly annexed Norway, including Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland.29
Kalmar had united the three main kingdoms under a decentralized administration with the Catholic Church serving as the most effective means of communication and control. Indeed, political conquest was largely a consequence of religious missions moving into the northern regions of Fennoscandia; the Church often had a greater influence in the hinterland of the realms than the state itself.30 When Kalmar ended, Catholicism was quickly toppled as the Danish and Swedish Crowns each laid claim to Church holdings within their kingdoms and laid the foundation for more centralized states on the ruins of this old institution.31 This period of Scandinavian history can largely be characterized as a transfer of resources and authority from the medieval and religious to the modern and princely. While the historiography of state formation as a foregone conclusion may be anachronistic, a nuanced teleological interpretation of the record can serve to glean seeds of subsequent theological fruits from the political aspirations of these Protestant princes.
As in the rest of Europe, the Pre-Reformation Catholic Church held a monopoly on morality, as only they could explain scripture and divine law, and all souls depended on them for salvation. All aspects of life related to the Church and there was none wherein they could not interfere, oft to the chagrin of the Crown. Scandinavia was unique though in that her Churches have always been distinctly nationalistic. All but one Danish bishop in the early sixteenth century were Danish noblemen lacking theological education.32 The Danish Church had been uniquely national in character since the mid-fourteenth century, lacking the foreign influence more common in larger southern principalities. Under Kalmar, Sweden and Norway were closer to Rome; all but one Swedish bishop was a member of the gentry or middle class. After independence though, King Gustav Vasa appointed Swedish nobles to all vacant episcopates and said that if the Pope did not approve then he would govern the Church himself.33 Denmark brought the national character of her Church into Norway with the conquest, paving the way for another religious polity distinct from Rome.
Owing perhaps to their proximity to Saxony, Scandinavian princes opted to adopt Lutheranism as their principal Protestant theology. The Scandinavian Reformation took place earlier than that of England, and Luther’s writings became influential before Calvin’s, and were influential much closer to Scandinavia. The early Reformation was alluring to many northern princes who were at once tired of the Church meddling with political affairs and who also saw an opportunity to gain immense wealth through expropriation of episcopal land; the theological element was perhaps an afterthought in many circumstances, with Protestantism being more of a collegiality against Roman rule rather than purely a doctrinal dissatisfaction. While previously the Pope could call for the excommunication of a prince, meaning subjects were no longer bound to follow their rule, Protestantism provided these princes with an opportunity to break from the Church without fear of alienating the peasantry. If the peasants bought in to Lutheran or Calvinist theology, it would also mean they rejected the heretical teaching of Rome, ensuring their continued allegiance to the local Crown. Accordingly, the Reformation eschewed the ideological monopoly of Rome and replaced it with a greater emphasis on nationalism, particularly in the already nationalistic Scandinavia.
Martin Luther was a Saxon theologian who rebelled against Rome over what he deemed to be impious practices that strayed from the principles outlined in scripture. While literacy was not yet widespread, the Gutenbergian printing press brought with it an increased capacity to publish written work.34 Previously, all books had to be transcribed by hand. Since literacy was a skill only taught to the elite, most commoners had never read the Bible for themselves; Mass was the only means by which an illiterate peasant could ever experience God’s word. The printing press revolutionized Church life, as soon after its creation believers might be able to get their own hands on a copy of the Good Book, with literacy becoming more common and accessible as a result. In keeping with these preferences for scripture and accessibility, the essence of Luther’s theology was that salvation came from God rather than the Church, mirroring the shift away from hermeneutic monopoly that followed widespread printing; one’s salvation was now in one’s own hands, rather than that of the Church. Lutheran soteriology believes that salvation is open to all who seek out and find faith in Christ; salvation can be lost if faith is lost.35 In contrast to Calvinism’s deterministic predestination, Lutheranism places a greater emphasis on an individual’s free will and on the capacity for all to find Christ; salvation is open to everyone. Calvinism’s anxiety over status as elect bred a classist, xenophobic narcissism that othered people who were deemed beyond the grace of God by a given observer. Lutheranism’s openness and inclusivity is perhaps a reflection of the more communal character of Scandinavian society; there was less religious diversity so there was no need to exclude people from frameworks of salvation. This openness and the liberal attitudes towards salvation it created played an integral role in the development of Nordic social democracy.
Roots of Modern Social Democracy
Lutheranism ushered in a sense of individual free will and wellbeing, while also retaining the importance of community central to Catholicism. Modern Nordic social democracy can itself be seen as a modern form of religion, a secular Lutheranism. Robert H. Nelson contends that many modern ideologies are actually forms of religion, and that this conceptual framework provides greater insight when attempting to understand modern political and economic history.36 The immense influence of Marxism or Social Darwinism today can only be fully understood in a context where they are seen as modern bearers of traditional Christian heritage. We fight over these principles in the same way that medieval believers fought over their own. While the deistic component has been dismantled, the principles thereunder still remain, stripped of their vestments and adorned with the language of secularism. Rather than these ideologies filling a void left in the wake of Christian belief, they are inheritors and successors of that belief, adapted to the preferred language of the age. Just as Calvinism bred capitalism, Lutheranism bred Nordic social democracy.
In the wake of the Second World War, the Nordic states developed an incomparably strong labour movement. The rampant inequality that led to the political upheaval of Russia and Germany in the previous decades likely served as a warning to Nordic governments that inequality begets revolution. Perhaps as a conceptual middle ground between the unregulated free market capitalism of to their west and the soviet communism to their east, Nordic states developed a free market with significant state control, particularly regarding the provision of welfare to its citizens. The thought is that the state has an obligation to protect its citizens from the pitfalls and inequalities inherent in the free market.37 Indeed, Nordic states are generally comparable to their European and Anglo peers in terms of wealth distribution prior to government redistribution, but they are among the most equal states in the world after this redistribution. The notion that all people are capable of being saved, and that a community has an obligation to take care of its members, are principles that have been directly inherited from the Lutheran tradition, and they are, in my view, the closest any state has come to embodying the principle of agape. Nordic poor relief is a matter of the state because the state is vested with the responsibility to ensure there is a basic level of economic security for all people, in contrast to the Anglo states where poverty is considered a personal failing and attaining salvation has been delegated to every man for himself, so to speak.
V. Reviewing the Data
These modern tendrils of early modern religious thought have had remarkable ramifications. Interjurisdictional comparisons highlight the distinction between the Calvinist influence on Anglo states and the Lutheran influence on Nordic ones. To follow is a summary of various statistics that attempt to compare national wellbeing in these countries, with the aim of highlighting the superiority of the Nordic model in abating poverty.
The World Giving Indexis an annual ranking of countries based on their overall charitability. In each of the surveyed countries, they asked residents the same three questions: whether they volunteered time at a charitable organization, whether they donated money towards a charitable cause, and whether they helped a person in need during the previous month. While these questions are perhaps insufficient in their capacity to truly assess metrics for the overall charitability of a nation, their results are noteworthy insofar as they inspired the research to follow:
| Fig. 1: World Giving Index, 2022:38 | |
| 3. | US |
| 4. | Australia |
| 5. | NZ |
| 8. | Canada |
| 17. | UK |
| 23. | Iceland |
| 24. | Denmark |
| 32. | Norway |
| 50. | Sweden |
| 74. | Finland |
The upper echelon of the list is dominated by former colonies of the British Empire; within the top ten, only Indonesia (1) and Ukraine (10) lack British colonial history. Notably, there seems to be no correlation between the development of a nation and its overall charitability, with very poor countries often ranking quite highly and very developed countries occasionally ranking quite low. Of the 119 countries on the list, there are 31 former English colonies, 15 of which occupy spots at or above rank 31; they are decidedly overrepresented at the top of the list.39 While there seems to be no correlation between charitability and national development, there is a definite correlation between English influence and charitability, potentially highlighting its irrelevance as a means of addressing poverty.40
In contrast, the Human Poverty Index ranked countries based on the prevalence of poverty within their borders. Countries with less poverty rank more highly:
| Fig. 2: Human Poverty Index, 2008:41 | ||
| 1. | Sweden | 6.3 |
| 2. | Norway | 6.8 |
| 4. | Finland | 8.1 |
| 5. | Denmark | 8.2 |
| 8. | Canada | 10.9 |
| 13. | Australia | 12.1 |
| 16. | UK | 14.8 |
| 17. | US | 15.4 |
The Nordic countries (and the nearby Dutch) round out the top five, with the Anglo states mostly spread throughout the teens. Contrast this with countries ranked by charitable donations as a percentage of GDP:
| Fig. 3: Charitable Donations as a % of GDP, 2016:42 | ||
| 1. | US | 1.44% |
| 2. | NZ | 0.79% |
| 3. | Canada | 0.77% |
| 4. | UK | 0.54% |
| 11. | Australia | 0.23% |
| 14. | Sweden | 0.16% |
| 16. | Finland | 0.13% |
| 18. | Norway | 0.11% |
The United States in particular, donating nearly twice as much as runner-up New Zealand, is nevertheless still the peer state most affected by poverty. All the while, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, the least charitable countries in the peer group, are the most successful countries in the world at combatting poverty. There is, prima facie, an inverse relationship between charitability and poverty relief among the peer countries listed.
More insight into human wellbeing in these states can be gleaned by analyzing metrics of income and wealth. The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion often used to compare wealth or income inequality between jurisdictions. Regarding income, a country with a Gini of 0 would be perfectly equal, with all citizens earning the same amount. A country with a Gini of 1 would be entirely unequal, with one person earning everything while the remainder earn nothing. Countries with Gini’s closer to 0 are accordingly more equal, while ones closer to 1 are less equal. Below are the five Nordic states and the five Anglo states and their income Gini coefficient’s before taxes and transfers:
| Fig. 4: Income Gini pre-taxes, OECD, 2017-2021:43 | ||
| 1. | Iceland | 0.369 |
| 6. | Sweden | 0.433 |
| 8. | Norway | 0.436 |
| 9. | Canada | 0.438 |
| 10. | Australia | 0.441 |
| 12. | Denmark | 0.445 |
| 16. | NZ | 0.454 |
| 28. | UK | 0.507 |
| 31. | Finland | 0.516 |
| 32. | US | 0.517 |
Iceland is the most income equal country on earth. Notably, before taxes, the Nordic countries do not all perform significantly better than their Anglo peers, with Finland being on par with the United States and Norway being on par with Canada. These countries all perform extraordinarily well when compared with the rest of the world. We see a telling picture though when we compare these figures with the same after taxes and government transfers:
| Fig. 5: Income Gini post-taxes:44 | ||
| 1. | Iceland | 0.250 |
| 6. | Norway | 0.263 |
| 7. | Finland | 0.265 |
| 8. | Denmark | 0.268 |
| 10. | Sweden | 0.276 |
| 11. | Canada | 0.280 |
| 23. | Australia | 0.318 |
| 24. | NZ | 0.320 |
| 30. | UK | 0.355 |
| 32. | US | 0.375 |
Here the disparity is more apparent. While every country’s Gini improved overall, the rank of most Anglo states (and Sweden) decreased, while all of the other Nordic states increased.45 These nations are not exceptionally disparate from one another; Canada and Sweden are often ranked similarly in terms of wellbeing. Regardless, it is noteworthy that all of the Nordic states rank more highly than all of the Anglo states, likely pointing to some effective policy consideration. Note though that income equality does not consider the amount being earned; an equal society may be equally poor, rather than rich. Below is the median wealth per adult by country in 2022:
| Fig. 6: Median Wealth per Adult, 2022:46 | ||
| 1. | Iceland | $413,193 |
| 4. | Australia | $247,453 |
| 6. | NZ | $193,065 |
| 7. | Denmark | $186,041 |
| 9. | UK | $151,825 |
| 10. | Norway | $143,887 |
| 11. | Canada | $137,633 |
| 15. | US | $107,739 |
| 24. | Finland | $84,093 |
| 26. | Sweden | $77,515 |
While all of these countries are nevertheless among the wealthiest in the world, there is considerable disparity between peer groups, with the median Icelander being five times as wealthy as the median Swede. In fact, Sweden is exceptionally unequal in terms of wealth. Below is the wealth Gini for 2021:
| Fig. 7: Wealth Gini, 2021:47 | ||
| 12. | Sweden | 0.881 |
| 25. | US | 0.850 |
| 80. | Norway | 0.794 |
| 117. | Finland | 0.744 |
| 122. | Denmark | 0.739 |
| 131. | Canada | 0.726 |
| 140. | UK | 0.706 |
| 147. | NZ | 0.700 |
| 163. | Australia | 0.662 |
| 65. | Iceland | 0.649 |
Sweden is one of the most wealth-unequal countries on Earth, on par with Russia and Brazil and worse off than the US, as well as being the least wealthy on average in both peer groups, despite being tenth overall in terms of after-tax income equality. While most Swedes earn around the same amount per year, the bulk of this money is either going towards rent or taxes, expenses that do not generate individual wealth. Despite this, it still ranks amongst its Nordic peers in measures of happiness, prosperity, and combatting poverty. While the average Swede does not retain as much wealth as the average Icelander or Australian, they work within a system that prioritizes their needs and provides for them. Just as a civil servant with considerable time off and benefits may make less money on paper than an independent contractor, but that does not necessarily mean they have a lower quality of life than their self-employed peer.
Money is not everything. While wealthy countries tend to be happier than poor countries, metrics of wellbeing should take a holistic approach in quantifying prosperity. The Human Development Index is a combined measure of a nation’s education, income, and life expectancy. There are shortcomings in this index – like using GDP per capita as a metric for income rather than a median figure, and conflating years of schooling with quality of education – but it nevertheless paints a picture of what states are generally healthy, wealthy, and educated.
| Fig. 8: Human Development Index, 2022:48 | ||
| 2. | Norway | 0.966 |
| 3. | Iceland | 0.959 |
| 5. | Denmark | 0.952 |
| 5. | Sweden | 0.952 |
| 10. | Australia | 0.949 |
| 12. | Finland | 0.942 |
| 15. | UK | 0.940 |
| 16. | NZ | 0.939 |
| 18. | Canada | 0.935 |
| 20. | US | 0.927 |
Again, the Nordic countries dominate the overall rankings and generally outperform their Anglo peers. While Australia nudges out Finland, this is only a result of Australia having produced a greater amount of overall wealth. Inequality adjusted HDI takes these factors into consideration.
| Fig. 9: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index, 2022:49 | ||
| 1. | Iceland | 0.910 |
| 2. | Norway | 0.903 |
| 3. | Denmark | 0.952 |
| 5. | Finland | 0.886 |
| 10. | Sweden | 0.878 |
| 12. | UK | 0.865 |
| 13. | Canada | 0.864 |
| 14. | Australia | 0.860 |
| 17. | NZ | 0.856 |
| 27. | US | 0.823 |
Once again, we see redistributive policymaking firmly places the Nordic countries at the top of the list, with Anglo states hovering around the same rank as before redistribution or falling lower.
Two broad-scale metrics of wellbeing are the Legatum Prosperity Index and the Social Progress Index. The former considers factors such as state policy towards the natural environment as well as the financial environment within a given state, while the later considers how effectively a state provides for its citizenry.
| Fig. 10: Legatum Prosperity Index:50 | ||
| 1. | Denmark | 84.55 |
| 2. | Sweden | 83.67 |
| 3. | Norway | 83.59 |
| 4. | Finland | 83.47 |
| 8. | Iceland | 81.02 |
| 10. | NZ | 80.47 |
| 12. | UK | 79.95 |
| 13. | Canada | 79.62 |
| 15. | Australia | 79.36 |
| 19. | US | 77.44 |
| Fig. 11: Social Progress Index, 2022:51 | ||
| 1. | Norway | 90.74 |
| 2. | Denmark | 90.54 |
| 3. | Finland | 90.46 |
| 5. | Iceland | 89.54 |
| 6. | Sweden | 89.42 |
| 10. | Canada | 88.17 |
| 12. | Australia | 87.83 |
| 15. | NZ | 87.26 |
| 19. | UK | 86.13 |
| 25. | US | 84.65 |
Once again, a similar pattern emerges. These metrics often fail to take personal preference into consideration though, preferring to analyze quantifiable rather than quantitative metrics. Alternatively, the World Happiness Report measures subjective life satisfaction among participants within surveyed countries, providing insight into how all of these policies are viewed by the people themselves.
| Fig. 12: World Happiness Report, 2024:52 | ||
| 1. | Finland | 7.741 |
| 2. | Denmark | 7.583 |
| 3. | Iceland | 7.525 |
| 4. | Sweden | 7.344 |
| 7. | Norway | 7.302 |
| 10. | Australia | 7.057 |
| 11. | NZ | 7.029 |
| 15. | Canada | 6.900 |
| 20. | UK | 6.749 |
| 23. | US | 6.725 |
Of course, no surprises here. While subjective political preferences may cloud one’s perception of certain metrics above, it is difficult to argue against subjective life satisfaction when it comes to analyzing a country’s success. Despite being cold, sparsely populated, and subject to considerable taxation, the Nordic states tend to outperform all of their peers on metrics of national wellbeing. Nordic citizens trust their governments and believe in the capacity of the welfare state to alleviate episodes of turmoil and economic difficulty. The state is a servant of the people rather than the other way around. While Anglo states do indeed perform exceptionally well on a global scale, we routinely fall behind our Nordic peers, highlighting the opportunity for beneficial public policy reform and the path we ought to take to achieve it.
VI. Conclusions
Oscar Wilde wrote that charity is an inadequate mode of partial restitution, a remedy that perpetuates the disease of poverty instead of curing it.53 While charity is but one of many factors that shape the nature of poverty and inequality in a given country, it is clear that there is a general disparity in the way that Nordic and Anglo states treat the poor, with Nordic states being relatively more egalitarian. In those states, charity is embedded within state expectations, following the Lutheran notion that salvation is open to all and there is an expectation of equality. In contrast, Anglo countries largely treat charity as a vehicle for the wealthy to gain prestige and reduce their tax burden, rather than being a means of combatting systemic issues. As shown, Nordic countries rank higher than Anglo ones on indices of equality, development, and happiness, reflecting the notion that it is social welfare, rather than charity, that is the superior method for reducing inequality and helping the poor.
A historical analysis of the charitable ethos reveals its roots in the philosophy of the eastern Mediterranean. Charity as we know it stems from an all-encompassing love for God and one’s community, described by Plato as agape. It was this notion that underscored the basis of New Testament morality, with charitable love being the ultimate virtue. Early Church fathers reaffirmed this but set the stage for subsequent divergence via the incorporation of moral dualism and predestination, tenets that serve to divide the Church and support exclusionary attitudes towards salvation. The theological differences between Calvinism and Lutheranism that arose during the Reformation highlight these diverging interpretations, with the former treating work as something done to prove salvation, while the later interpreted work as something that benefits one’s self and one’s community. Accordingly, charity in England developed a market-based approach centred on private philanthropy and an ad hoc response by the courts and Crown, in stark contrast to the social democratic welfare states pioneered in modern Scandinavia. The data confirms that Nordic countries today are better than their Anglo peers, if only slightly, at combatting poverty and promoting human wellbeing.
However, this finding rests on the assumption that the goal of charity is in fact poor relief. One could just as easily conclude that the purpose of charity is to create money laundering entities that subsidize tax burdens for the wealthy and grant them notoriety as altruistic philanthropists. Ultimately, the political preferences of an individual determine their attitude towards charity. What this paper can show, conclusively in my view, is that some of the greatest minds and most revered figures in history have upheld agape, true charity, as the highest of all virtues. While modern conservatives may balk at the Lutheran, egalitarian roots of Nordic public policy, their model is seemingly much closer to Christ than that employed in England.
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